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Monday, July 31, 2006

The rockets go quiet: considering Hezbollah's command and control 


According to Stratfor($), Hezbollah did not fire a single rocket during the calendar day July 31, Lebanon time. I have not found a press account that verifies this assertion, but if true it puts Israel in a very tough spot.

Israel got a breather July 31 from the blaring of sirens and steady barrage of Katyusha rocket attacks after nearly 20 days of heavy fighting. Hezbollah has managed to launch an average of 130-160 rockets per day into northern Israel since the conflict began. The grand total of confirmed rocket attacks for July 31 as of midnight Israeli time, however, stands at zero.

From a military standpoint, Israel's cease-fire demonstrated the strength of Hezbollah's command-and-control structure, even after taking a beating by Israeli forces. Hezbollah's communication lines clearly remain intact, as its military commanders evidently managed to signal the group's various units to switch off rocket attacks almost immediately after the cease-fire was declared.

Hezbollah quickly realized the benefits of refraining from attacks during this 48-hour cease-fire. Israel already faced piling international condemnation for its military operations in Lebanon, but the July 30 Israeli airstrike in the Lebanese village of Qana clearly shifted the focus onto the number of humanitarian crises created by this conflict, playing right into Hezbollah's hands.

Hezbollah is operating under the belief that a large toll in civilian casualties will expedite a cease-fire before the Israeli army completes its stated objective of significantly degrading Hezbollah's capabilities. Not only would Hezbollah be able to retain its offensive stature, but it would also claim victory as being the only Arab force capable of standing up to Israeli aggression and forcing an Israeli military defeat. By committing to a temporary cease-fire it is not even a signatory to, Hezbollah is making it exceedingly difficult for the United States to give the green light to Israel to resume its military offensive with full force while Israel is quickly earning the aggressor label around the globe.

Israel cannot afford to scale back its military plans and allow Hezbollah to raise its stature at the expense of Israeli national security. Admitting defeat to Hezbollah and exposing Israel's military weakness after years of building up an image of the most formidable military in the region would carry devastating consequences for Israel, and end up fracturing the ruling government. As Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said July 31, "there is no cease-fire and there will be no cease-fire in the coming days." Movements on the ground already indicate Israel is preparing for a larger ground campaign to root out Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon and to inflict greater damage on Hezbollah forces. This is an operation that is going to take a good deal of time.

But time is something Israel seriously lacks. Israel's air campaign has not achieved its desired results in a timely manner, placing a substantial pressure on Washington to table an immediate cease-fire, or at least to take real steps toward scaling down the conflict. The 48-hour cease-fire, which notably was announced by the U.S. State Department, was designed to ease some of this pressure by allowing Lebanese citizens in the south to flee northward, so avoiding becoming Hezbollah's human shields when Israeli attacks resume. Nonetheless, Israel's actions are putting a serious strain on U.S. relations with its European and Arab allies, which do not have the same tolerance level Washington does for Israel's military campaign, and which are facing mounting political pressure at home to do something to contain the conflict.

Hawks in Israel and the United States have been warning against the consequences of a ceasefire for days now, and Stratfor's description of the situation generally lines up with those who believe that Israel has failed to avoid the strategic trap that Hezbollah set for it. There is no need to belabor the argument, since the die is now cast, at least until it is cast again.

Stratfor does, however, make a very interesting point about the effectiveness of Hezbollah's command and control, both in the abstract and after almost three weeks of combat. It gave an order not to shoot rockets, and all over southern Lebanon the launchers went quiet. These guys did what they were told to do with excellent discipline, just as The Guardian predicted in the story linked through this post. Remember that the next time somebody argues that Hezbollah did not intend to do a particular thing. Its fighters apparently reflect the intentions of their commanders as efficiently as the soldiers in any Western army.

2 Comments:

By Blogger Cardinalpark, at Mon Jul 31, 07:47:00 PM:

Of course, the other possibility is that...they've lost!

We live in such a strange world that when a combatant in a war stops shooting, the perception is that they've...won? Are you kidding.

George Friedman is an intellgince analyst paralyzed by analysis.

Maybe Iran has figured out where this is heading (the defeat of their frontline forces in Lebanon) and has told them to stand down before they are thoroughly embarrased. So I agree with the C&C point (not that I figured much differently) but have to wonder about the logic that says the absence of Hezbollah rockets signals their success. Doesn't Hez look incredibly weak, especially after all the noise about Qana? Shouldn't they be mobilizing for all out war to defend Lebanon against the bloodthirsty IDF?  

By Anonymous Anonymous, at Mon Jul 31, 09:09:00 PM:

I don't think that demonstrating the ability to standown the rocket attacks is a huge deal. We all know that Hezbollah is fairly well -trained and have the required discipline. Fanatical ideology often breeds a ruthless adherence to structure and orders.

Iran has obviously invested well and had 6 years to prepare them unimpeded.

As far as communications, they are obviously adequately equipped with the necessary communications which in the case of a small area like southern Lebanon, is not difficult to maintain. If every major launcher position has a "site commander" (undoubtably), then communicating via with fairly run-of-the-mill radio equipment is not difficult to achieve due to the short distances. Even walkie talkies could help relay the word down the line. Indeed, although they most likely are equipped with military gear, the chance for improvising commercial communications is likely also.

I suppose cellphone service would also be possible with a strategically placed mobile transmitter.

Internet, radio, cellphone, regular phones, and even TV are all possibilities. Do not forget "civilian" runners too.
If Lebanon was as large as Iraq, then you would have a much bigger problem no doubt.

There is just so much on the world market, I would think that they have multiple nodes of communication capability and Israel would well heed that it may be impossible to cutoff Hezbollah's comm and should plan the fight with that expectation in mind.

In fact, Israel could exploit Hezbollah's ability to communicate by using deception, surprise and disinformation to lure them into big fish kills. No doubt Israel has cooked something up.  

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